Southern Methodist University

SMU Scholar
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2013

The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel and
Beyond
Anthony J. Colangelo
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law

Recommended Citation
Anthony J. Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel and Beyond, 44 Geo. J. Int'l
L. 1329 (2013)

This document is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of SMU
Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND THE LAW OF
NATIONS IN KIOBEL AND BEYOND
ANTHONYJ. COLANGELO*
ABSTRACT

In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum the U.S. Supreme Court wrongly
applied a presumption against extraterritoriality to claims authorized by the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Even assuming such a presumption properly could
extend to the A TS and claims authorized thereunder, the presumption is easily
overcome by Congress's unambiguous instruction that the statute encompasses
violations of "the law of nations," which includes both substantive and jurisdictionalcomponents-includingprinciples ofextraternitoialjurisdiction.Early
19th Century case law and congressional reaction thereto clearly demonstrate
that Congress expressly invoked "the law of nations" to overturn the Court's
imposition of a limitingpresumption in the piracy context in order to grant the
United States universaljurisdiction over that offense. Rather than rely on this
strong indiciaof congressionalintent, the Court in Kiobel instead seized upon a
judicially invented presumption that came into existence twenty years after the
ATS was enacted, gave it novel application to a jurisdictional statute and
claims authorized thereunder, and then projected it backward in time.
Yet Kiobel nonetheless correctly determined that conduct-regulatingrules of
decision under the ATS derivefrom internationallaw and that domestic law of
the forum, or lex fori, provides procedures and remedies. This framework is
consistent with public and private law principles of the law of nations under
which the statute ought to be construed. Although thisframework should have led
the Court to conclude that the claims in Kiobel were actionable, the Court's
misunderstanding has not completely erased the possibility of future claims
involving foreign elements from being brought under the statute. The Court left
the door open for claims that sufficiently "touch and concern" the United States.
The Article concludes that, going forward, courts should use international
law for the conduct-regulating rules under the ATS and domestic law for
procedures and remedies.Jurisdictionalprinciples of the law of nations ought to
guide analysis of whether claims involving foreign elements sufficiently touch
and concern the United States so as to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality.

* Associate Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. @ 2013, AnthonyJ. Colangelo.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the last thirty years or so, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has
generated its own cottage industry of judicial opinions and scholarly
articles. The 1789 statute, which grants U.S. district courts "original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations"' has launched waves of court decisions
and academic commentary ranging from the particulars about both
historical and current relationships between U.S. and international law
as well as the existence and scope of corporate liability under international law, to broader debates about the place of international human
rights litigation in U.S. courts.2
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the United States Supreme Court
recently posed a couple of questions that promise to affect, if not
altogether determine, the viability of ATS claims for the foreseeable
future; specifically, the Court asked "[w] hether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to
recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring
within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States."'
Causes of action arising in foreign territory have comprised both the

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
2. For instance, as of March 11, 2013, the citation pulls up 871 judicial opinions and 2,110
scholarly articles on LexisNexis. For a range of different scholars' and practitioners' opinions on
these and other ATS issues, see Special Feature: Kiobel Symposium, SCOTUSBLOG, http://
www.scotusblog.com/category/special-features/kiobel-symposium/ (last visitedJune 25, 2013).
3. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738, 1738 (2012) (order directing
re-argument).
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vast majority and the most contentious ATS claims over the past three
decades. 4 Thus Kiobel effectively determines whether the ATS survives
as a vehicle for human rights claims arising abroad in U.S. courts or,
instead, is "placed on the shelf' 5 until Congress amends the statute to
the satisfaction of the Court.
Kiobel applied a presumption against extraterritoriality to claims
arising under the ATS and held that the claims at issue in the case
were not actionable because they were brought by foreigners against
foreigners for conduct abroad.' The presumption is a canon of statutory construction intended to capture Congress's intent that statutes
ordinarily do not apply outside U.S. territory unless Congress affirmatively indicates extraterritorial application.7 I have elsewhere described
the problem with using the presumption to construe a jurisdictional
statute like the ATS and the causes of action it authorizes.8 In this
Article I want to engage the Court's decision on its own terms. Even
assuming a presumption against extraterritoriality properly extends to
the ATS and causes of action authorized thereunder, I argue that the
Court in Kiobel got it wrong. Specifically, the ATS does affirmatively
indicate extraterritorial application by expressly invoking "the law of
nations."' That law comprises both substantive and jurisdictional principles, and Congress intended the ATS to comprise these principles as
well.
Because the ATS invokes the law of nations, the better canon for
construing the statute is the Charming Betsy canon, which instructs
courts to construe statutes in conformity with international law if
possible."o According to this canon, claims involving extraterritorial

4. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011)
(en banc); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
5. Cf Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 719 (2004) ("[T]here is every reason to suppose
that the First Congress did not pass the ATS as ajurisdictional convenience to be placed on the
shelf for use by a future Congress or state legislature that might, someday, authorize the creation
of causes of action or itself decide to make some element of the law of nations actionable for the
benefit of foreigners.").
6. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
7. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
8. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Kiobel Contradicts Morrison, OPINo
Julis, (May 10, 2013,9:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/05/10/kiobel-insta-symposium-kiobelcontradicts-morrison/; Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: An ExtraterritorialCause of
Action, OPINIOJURIS, (Apr. 17, 2013, 4:26 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-instasymposium-an-extraterritorial-cause-of-action/.
9. 28 U.S.C. 1350 (2006).
10. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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activity and, in particular, claims involving what are called "universal
jurisdiction" violations of the law of nations, should be actionable
under the ATS. Once it is understood that the law of nations or international law supplies the applicable conduct-regulating rule under
the ATS and that the law of nations also provides that procedures
and the form of remedy come from the domestic law of the forum, or
the lex fori, the better construction emerges that the ATS confers
geographically unlimited jurisdiction over universal jurisdiction violations of the law of nations.
The Article concludes by observing that although Kiobel did not
reach this result, it did adopt the correct choice-of-law framework:
namely, that international law supplies the conduct-regulating rules
under the ATS and forum law provides procedures and remedies.
Moreover, it is still feasible under Kiobel for courts to entertain claims
with foreign elements. To figure out when such claims are actionable,
I suggest courts look to other principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction
under international law for guidance.
II.

THE ATS

AFFIRMATIVELY CONFERS UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

According to the Supreme Court, a statute applies outside U.S.
territory if it contains a "clear indication of extraterritorial application."" The ATS contains such an indication: it clearly indicates
universal jurisdiction to cover claims arising everywhere by expressly
incorporating the law of nations, which comprises both substantive and
jurisdictional components." Accordingly, no presumption against extraterritoriality should have applied to the ATS.
A much-cited case from 1818 generally regarded as the Supreme
Court's first invention of a presumption against extraterritoriality,
United States v. Palmer, applied a limiting presumption to block U.S.
jurisdiction over the universal offense of piracy on a foreign-flag vessel
because the vessel was considered the legal equivalent of foreign
sovereign territory.' 3 Congress immediately rejected that construction
and enacted a new statute the very next year granting universal jurisdiction. Crucially, Congress rewrote the statute to affirmatively confer

11. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878 (observing that a statute applies extraterritorially if it contains
"clear indication of an extraterritorial application").
12. See AnthonyJ. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality,97 VA. L. REv. 1019, 1032
(2011) (explaining that "international law is not comprised of only substantive rules; it is also
jurisdictional-including rules of extraterritorial jurisdiction").
13. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 632-33 (1818).
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universal jurisdiction by expressly granting jurisdiction over "piracy, as
defined by the law of nations."14 By invoking "the law of nations,"
Congress purposefully authorized the application of both an international substantive rule and an international jurisdictional principle
so as to confer upon U.S. courts universal jurisdiction to apply the
international substantive rule.' 5 The ATS similarly expressly confers
jurisdiction over torts "in violation of the law of nations,"1 and similarly should be understood to authorize application of international
substantive and jurisdictional components of that law.
In brief, Congress knew how to bestow universal jurisdiction over
law-of-nations violations in what was clearly considered foreign territory, and did so by explicitly incorporating into statutes "the law of
nations," which includes both substantive and jurisdictional components. It was inappropriate for the Supreme Court to read that "affirmative indication" ofjurisdiction out of the ATS in Kiobel" 7-indeed, it was
especially inappropriate because Congress could not have known of
any judicially created presumption at the time it enacted the ATS and
used precisely the "law of nations" language to repudiate a presumption against extraterritoriality once before.
UniversalJurisdictionAuthorizes All States to Apply the Law ofNations

A.

To understand how the ATS confers universal jurisdiction under
the law of nations it is necessary to understand universal jurisdiction.
The international legal principle existed at the time Congress enacted the ATS,' 8 it exists under the "present-day law of nations," 9 and
it was recognized by the Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.2 0
Universal jurisdiction grants every state in the world jurisdiction to
apply international law to certain violations of the law of nations, even
if the state had no connection to the violation when and where it
occurred. 21 To be sure, this is one of the principle's defining characteristics: when states exercise universal jurisdiction, they do not apply

14. An Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States, and Punish the Crime of Piracy,
ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14 (1819).
15. See infra notes 46-51.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. (2006).
17. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010).
18. See infra note 22.

19. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
20. See id.at 732.
21. See AnthonyJ. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of UniversalJurisdiction,47 VA. J. INT'L L. 149,
150-51 (2006).
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solely national law to conduct beyond their borders but an international law that already applied to the conduct when and where it
occurred.
The Supreme Court made this point unambiguously in United States
v. Smith with regard to the original universal jurisdiction offense of
piracy:
[t]he common law .. . recognises and punishes piracy as an
offence, not against its own municipal code, but as an offence
against the law of nations, (which is part of the common law), as
an offence against the universal law of society, a pirate being
deemed an enemy of the human race.
The substantive prohibition on universal violations of the law of nations
is tied intimately with a jurisdictional principle that all states may enforce that prohibition:
And the general practice of all nations, in punishing all persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have committed this
offence against any persons whatsoever, with whom they are in
amity, is a conclusive proof that the offence is supposed to
depend, not upon the particular provisions of any municipal
code, but upon the law of nations, both for its definition and
punishment.2 3
Similarly, Blackstone declared piracy "an offence against the universal
law of society; a pirate being . .. hostis humani generis."24
As these authorities make clear, universal jurisdiction grants all states
jurisdiction to enforce international law. When a state exercises universal jurisdiction, it does not extend solely national law extraterritorially
to foreign conduct but rather acts as a decentralized enforcer of the
law of nations already applicable to the conduct when and where it
occurred.

22. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820).
23. Id. at 162. See also United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820)
(explaining that piracy is subject to "universal jurisdiction" and that it "is considered as an offence
within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations").
24. 4 WILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71. See also id. ("[B]y declaring war against all
mankind, all mankind must declare war against him . . . .").
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Universal jurisdiction works the same way today2 5 and should give
rise to ATS liability under Sosa's methodology. For example, Sosa
cited United States v. Smith-the criminal piracy case quoted at length
above-to demonstrate the "historical paradigms" that inform ATS
inquiries under "the present-day law of nations."2 6 As discussed, Smith's
definition of piracy under the law of nations included both a substantive and a jurisdictional component: substantively, piracy comprised
robbery on the high seas; jurisdictionally, "all nations. . . punish[] all
persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have committed this
offence against any persons whatsoever. ... " Immediately after citing
Smith, Sosa cited the Second Circuit's famous statement in Filirtigav.
Pefia-Iralathat, "for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has becomelike the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an

25. Today treaties, while not themselves the customary law of nations (since they are positive
agreements among states), provide strong evidence of what customary international law deems
universal jurisdiction violations by demonstrating "the customs and usages of civilized nations,"
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), resulting from widespread state practice ratifying
and implementing the treaties in domestic law. For example, treaties like the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts. 5.2 and 7.1,
Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, and the Montreal Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, arts. 5 and 7, Sept. 23,
1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, authorize and, in many situations, require the exercise of
jurisdiction by states parties with personal jurisdiction over offenders-even if the state had no
connection to the offense when it occurred. Any doubt about the customary lawmaking character
of the treaties is resolved by the fact that they do not condition the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by states parties with custody of the accused on the commission of the offense within
the territory of another state party to the treaty. By effectively extending the prohibition in the
treaty to any state in the world where the offense occurs, these treaties are quintessential
"law-making" treaties, or treaties of customary "norm-creating character." Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 138 (2d Cir. 2010); see also North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v.
Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 11 70-71 (Feb. 20);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REIATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATEs

§ 102(3)

(1987). In other

words, the treaties clearly reflect "the customs and usages of civilized nations," The PaqueteHabana,
175 U.S. at 700, with respect to both what conduct is substantively prohibited under the law of
nations and when states have jurisdiction over that conduct. In this regard, the treaties help cure
the Court's early lament in Smith that "[o]ffences ... against the law of nations, cannot, with any
accuracy, be said to be completely ascertained and defined in any public code recognised by the
common consent of nations." Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 159 (relying on writings of twenty-five
publicists or scholars to ascertain the settled definition and scope of piracy under the law of
nations). Today such a code largely exists in the form of widely ratified multilateral treaties. And
they unambiguously provide jurisdiction where a state gains personal jurisdiction over the
perpetrator of certain universal violations of the present-day law of nations-even if that state had
no connection to the violation when it occurred.
26. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
27. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 162.
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enemy of all mankind."2 8 Factually, Fildrtigainvolved a foreign plaintiff,
foreign defendant, and foreign conduct. Legally, as with Smith's recitation of universal jurisdiction over an "enemy of the human race,"
Fildrtiga'sinvocation of an "enemy of all mankind" encompasses both a
substantive prohibition and ajurisdictional principle that all states can
enforce that international legal prohibition.29 As the next section
explains, Sosa got it exactly right: the ATS affirmatively confers universal jurisdiction to apply the law of nations and no presumption against
extraterritoriality should limit the application of that law.
B.

The ATS Embodies Universaljurisdiction

The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that a presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to U.S. statutes.3 0 The presumption is not a
limitation on sovereignty but a canon of construction designed to
effectuate legislative intent.3 As the Court explained early on in United
States v. Palmer, even where Congress has power to legislate, general
statutory "words must be limited in some degree, and the intent of the
legislature will determine the extent of this limitation. For this intent
we must examine the law."3 2 When "examin[ing] the law," 3 3 "[a]ssuredly context can be consulted as well."3 4 The language and context of
the ATS clearly demonstrate that to the extent courts use the law of
nations as the rule of decision under the statute, the statute confers
universal jurisdiction under that law.
Palmer used a species of presumption against extraterritoriality to
restrictively construe the reach of a 1790 statute prohibiting piracy,
defined as "robbery ... upon the high seas" by "any person or persons."35 The Court held that the statute did not reach such acts
committed by foreigners against foreigners on a foreign-flag ship.3 6
Here it should be stressed- especially given the Court's framing of the
extraterritoriality issue in Kiobel-that piracy on another nation's ship
constituted a "violation [] of the law of nations occurring within the

28. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 603 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)).
29. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
30. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) ("When a statute gives no
clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.").
31. Id.
32. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 631-32.
33. Id.
34. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
35. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 632.
36. Id.
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territory of a sovereign other than the United States,"3 7 given that
traditionally "[a] vessel at sea is considered as a part of the territory to
which it belongs when at home. It carries with it the local legal rights
and legal jurisdiction of such locality."3 8
Indeed it was precisely this jurisdictional feature and the attendant
fear of foreign sovereign interference that caused the Court in Palmer
to restrict the 1790 piracy statute's scope. The Court first observed that
the title of the entire act-"'an act for the punishment of certain crimes
against the United States'-suggested that Congress's concern was
with "offences against the United States, not offences against the
human race."3 9 The Court then turned to its principal concern that
reading all of the piracy statute's general terms globally would interfere
with other nations' sovereignty by projecting U.S. law onto the legal
equivalent of foreign sovereign territory-namely, foreign-flag ships.
The 1790 act prohibited not just "robbery .. . upon the [high]
sea[s] "-which constituted piracy under the law of nations,4 0 but also
purely municipal offenses like "run [ing] away" with a ship or merchandise or "lay[ing] violent hands upon [a] commander." 4 1 These latter
offenses did not constitute piracy under the law of nations but were
instead referred to as "piracy ... by statute."4 These piracies by statute
were solely creatures of municipal or domestic law, not international
law. As a result, they were subject only to territorial (or flag) and
national jurisdiction, not universal jurisdiction.4 3
The PalmerCourt worried that Congress could not have intended all
of these other general terms prohibiting piracy by statute under
municipal law to apply globally to activities on foreign-flag ships. The
reason was that such extraterritorial application of U.S. law into a
foreign jurisdiction could interfere with foreign sovereignty:
But it cannot be supposed that the legislature intended to
punish a seaman on board a ship sailing under a foreign flag,
under the jurisdiction of a foreign government, who should lay

37. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738, 1738 (2012).
38. Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572, 574 (1880); see also St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S.
134,152 (1894); United States v. Smiley, 27 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 16,317).
39. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 631.
40. Smith, 18 U.S. (Wheat.) at 162.
41. Palmer, 16 U.S. (Wheat.) at 626-27.
42. 4 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *72. See also Colangelo, supra note 12, at 1061-75
(explaining the difference between piracy under the law of nations and piracy by statute).
43. Colangelo, supra note 12, at 1061-1075.
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violent hands upon his commander, or make a revolt in the
ship. These are offences against the nation under whose flag
the vessel sails, and within whose particular jurisdiction all on
board the vessel are. Every nation provides for such offences the
punishment its own policy may dictate; and no general words of
a statute ought to be construed to embrace them when committed by foreigners against a foreign government.4 4
The Court then reasoned backward from this supposition about the
piracies by statute listed in the latter part of the 1790 act to the
particular piracy in the case before it-robbery on the seas by "any
person"-and gave that piracy the same, limited construction.
According to Congress, however, the Court got it wrong. Palmerwas
"roundly criticized by contemporaries" for limiting the scope of the
1790 statute and stunting the United States's ability to prosecute piracy
under the law of nations.4 6 In one famous criticism, John Quincy
Adams renounced Palmeras "a sample ofjudicial logic-disingenuous,
false, and hollow" and an "enormous hole in the moral garment of this
nation made by this desperate thrust of the Supreme Court."4 7
Then, in direct response to Palmer, Congress passed a new piracy
statute the very next year to mend the hole Palmer had hewn and to
affirmatively create universal jurisdiction over piracy against the law of

44. Palmer, 16 U.S. (Wheat.) at 632-33. That Palmerhad to do with the fact that the offense
occurred on foreign territory is confirmed by the Court's decision just two years later in United
States v. Klintock, which dealt with the same section of the same 1790 statute as Palmer,but the
piracy had occurred on a stateless, instead of a foreign-flag, ship. United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 144 (1820). The Court distinguished Klintock on this basis and applied the statute on
the ground that Palmer only governed ships "sailing under the flag of a foreign State, whose
authority is acknowledged. This is the case which was presented to the Court [in Palmer]; and this
is the case which was decided." Id. at 151; see also id. at 152 (observing that general statutory terms
"ought not to be so construed as to extend to persons under the acknowledged authority of a
foreign State"). These cases make crystal clear that ships were deemed part of the territory of the
state under whose flag they sailed.
45. Palmer, 16 U.S. (Wheat.) at 633 ("That the general words of the two latter members of this
sentence [piracies by statute] are to be restricted to offences committed on board the vessels of
the United States, furnishes strong reason for believing that the legislature intended to impose the
same restriction on the general words used in the first member of the sentence [robbery on the
high seas or piracy under the law of nations].").
46. G. Edward White, The MarshallCourt and InternationalLaw: The Piracy Cases, 83 AM.J. INT'L
L. 727, 731 (1989).
47. J. Q Adams, diary entry for May 11, 1819, in 4 THE MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 363
(C. Adams ed., 1874-77).
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nations.4 8 The statute, accordingly, conferred jurisdiction over "any
person or persons whatsoever" who "shall, on the high seas, commit the
crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations."49
In short, to overrule Palmer and affirmatively indicate universal
jurisdiction, Congress expressly invoked the definition of piracy under
"the law of nations."5 0 The ATS contains a similar invocation. It too
confers jurisdiction over "all causes where an alien sues for a tort only
in violation of the law of nations .... "" It is passing strange for the
Supreme Court in Kiobel to evidently have found that precisely the type
of language Congress used to confer universal jurisdiction-and to
overrule the Court's limiting presumption once before-does not now
confer universal jurisdiction to apply the law of nations.
To be sure, when courts use the law of nations as the rule of decision
none of the presumption's motivating rationales apply. To the contrary, the rationales may even argue in favor of the exercise of U.S.
jurisdiction to fulfill U.S. obligations under international law in some
cases-for example, in cases where the United States has a responsibility to punish universal offenses like piracy. At bottom, the presumption
aims "to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those
of other nations which could result in international discord," 52 and to
heed the presumption that when Congress legislates, it "is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions."5 3 Although the ATS is a primarily jurisdictional statute,5 4 the presumption could in principle apply if
courts were to use purely domestic U.S. common law principles as
conduct-regulating rules of decision. In that situation, it would be
courts, not Congress, crafting "our laws." Yet as conduct-regulating
rules, those laws could still "clash" with foreign laws inside foreign
territory.55

48. See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 612 (E.D. Va. 2010) ("In response to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act of 1790 in Palmer, Congress passed the Act of 1819 to
make clear that it wished to proscribe not only piratical acts that had a nexus to the United States,
but also piracy as an international offense subject to universal jurisdiction."); ALFRED P. RUBIN,
THE LAw OF PIRACY 144 (2d ed. 1998) ("The immediate result of U.S. v. Palmerin the halls of the
Congress was the passage of [the Act of 1819] . . . .").
49. An Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States, and Punish the Crime of Piracy,
ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14 (1819) (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77 (1789).
52. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
53. Id.
54. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
55. ArabianAm. Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 248.
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But when U.S. courts apply the law of nations as the conductregulating rule, the potential for true conflicts of laws largely disappears. Unlike, for example, the Securities Exchange Act at issue in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, or the Sherman Antitrust Act at
issue in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 5 6-both of which
involved projecting purely U.S. domestic conduct-regulating laws into
foreign territory-the law of nations also applies to regulate conduct
inside foreign territories. Concerns about extraterritorial applications
of U.S. law conflicting with foreign law inside foreign territory largely
vanish since U.S. law authorizes application of an international law
already operative inside the foreign territory.
Further, while the presumption that Congress legislates with only
domestic concerns in mind may make sense for statutes reflecting
national values and preferences like the securities or antitrust laws, that
presumption holds far less intuitive force when Congress authorizes
application of the law of nations, which, after all, deals by definition
with foreign nations and shared values and preferences with those
nations. The Supreme Court has explained that courts can consider
"context" in determining the geographic scope of statutes.58 Here the
context is that the statute authorizes application of international, not
domestic, law, and the relevant canon of construction is CharmingBetsy,
under which courts construe ambiguous statutes in conformity with
international law.5 CharmingBetsy would allow and indeed sometimes
encourage U.S. jurisdiction, even where there is no U.S. connection to
the violation of the law of nations because international law would
allow and sometimes encourage the exercise of universal jurisdiction.
In sum, when Congress authorizes application of the law of nations,

56. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
57. The argument that the ATS should not reach foreign harms because it is unique in
authorizing civil liability under international law fails for at least three reasons. As an initial
matter, civil liability is explicitly built into the statute. Presumptions are only that: presumptions.
They do not apply where statutes are clear, and the ATS is clear on civil liability. Second, as noted
above, using international criminal law to discern the norm of international law actionable under
the ATS is consistent with Sosa's methodology, see supra Part I. Indeed, requiring a freestanding
norm of civil liability in international law would effectively render the ATS a dead letter, contrary
to Sosa's methodology and clear finding that the ATS is not a mere "jurisdictional convenience to
be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress . .. to make some element of the law of nations
actionable for the benefit of foreigners." Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, 719 (2004). Finally, as Part III explains
below, international law allows jurisdiction in civil suits between foreigners arising out of foreign
conduct or transactions.
58. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
59. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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it should be presumed to authorize application of all of the law of
nations, including the relevant law of jurisdiction. As the next Part
explains, the law of nations permits universal jurisdiction in civil suits.
In fact, historical authorities from the time of the ATS's enactment
suggest that it would have been contrary to the law of nations to close
U.S. courts to foreigners, thereby discriminating against them and
denying them access tojustice.
III.

THE LAW OF NATIONS CONTEMPLATES UNIVERSALJURISDICTION
IN CIVIL SUITS

A duty to provide access to justice existed under the classical law of
nations, endured through the 19th Century, and supports universal
jurisdiction in civil suits between foreigners under the ATS today. As
the Supreme Court acknowledged in Sosa 60 the law of nations traditionally included both public and private international law6' and linked
torts and crimes.
And then, as now, transitory torts can be brought in U.S. courts.6 3 In
fact, it would have been contrary to the law of nations at the time of the
ATS's enactment to close U.S. courts to foreigners, thereby discriminating against them and denying them access tojustice." As to the ATS in
particular, under longstanding principles of public and private interna-

60. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715 ("The law of nations included a second, more pedestrian element,
however, that did fall within the judicial sphere, as a body of judge-made law regulating the
conduct of individuals situated outside domestic boundaries and consequently carrying an
international savor.").
61. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 589 (1839) (describing private international law and conflict of laws in particular as part of "the law of nations"); JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICr OF LAws

§5

(describing "the importance of... international

principles in matters of mere private right and duty"), § 9 ("Thejurisprudence, then, arising from
the conflict of the laws of different nations, in their actual application to modern commerce and
intercourse, is a most interesting and important branch of public law. To no part of the world is it
of more interest and importance than to the United States .... This branch of public law may,
therefore, be fitly denominated private international law. . . ."), § 30 (including private international law as part "of the acknowledged law of nations") (Little, Brown and Co. 5th ed. 1857).
62. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723-24 (rejecting Sosa's argument that law-of-nations violations were
only "public wrongs" and explaining that "Vattel explicitly linked" criminal and civil remedies); see
also DavidJ. Seipp, The DistinctionBetween Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV.
59, 59 (1996) ("The distinction between crime and tort was not a difference between two kinds of
wrongful acts. In most instances, the same wrong could be prosecuted either as a crime or as a tort.
Nor was the distinction a difference between the kinds of persons who could initiate the actions. Victims could
initiateboth kinds.") (emphasis added).
63. See infra note 66-67.
64. See infra note 68-69.
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tional law, the law of nations provides conduct-regulating rules defining actionable universal jurisdiction violations of international law and
forum law, or the lexfori, provides the remedy.
A.

The Law of NationsAuthorizes UniversalAdjudicativeJurisdiction

To begin, as a matter of adjudicative jurisdiction, or the exercise of
jurisdiction by U.S. courts, there is nothing exceptional about U.S.
courts entertaining. suits between foreigners arising out of foreign
conduct or transactions, and it certainly is not a violation of international law. Joseph Story could not have been clearer on this point-the
relevant section from his famous Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws is
reproduced in full immediately below:
There are nations, indeed, which wholly refuse to take cognizance of controversies between foreigners, and remit them for
relief to their own domestic tribunals, or to that of the party
defendant; and, especially, as to matters originating in foreign
countries. Thus, in France, with few exceptions, the tribunals
do not entertain jurisdiction of controversies between foreigners respecting personal rights and interests. But this is a matter
of mere municipal policy and convenience, and does not result
from any principles of internationallaw. In England, and America,
on the other hand, suits are maintainable, and are constantly
maintained, between foreigners, where either of them is within
the territory of the State, in which the suit is brought.6 5
This has been so throughout U.S. history.66 In other words, all that is
needed is personal jurisdiction. In fact, according to Story:
All that any nation can, therefore, be justly required to do, is to
open its own tribunals to foreigners, in the same manner and
to the same extent, as they are open to its own subjects; and to
give them the same redress, as to rights and wrongs, which it deems

65. STORY, supra note 61, § 542 (emphasis added).
66. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (collecting cases).
67. See id.; see also STORY, supranote 61, § 554 ("It has already been stated, that by the common
law personal actions, being transitory, may be brought in any place where the party defendant can
be found. . . .").
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fit to acknowledge in its own municipal code for natives and
residents.6 8
According to Story, the private international law prescribing this requirement was a matter of "international justice."6 9 Thus there is nothing
unique about U.S. courts entertaining suits between foreigners, even
"as to matters originating in foreign countries": such suits "are maintainable, and are constantly maintained" in the United States, and affording redress to foreigners traditionally was a matter of international
70
justice.
B.

The Law of NationsAuthorizes UniversalPrescriptiveJurisdictionto
Apply InternationalLaw and Remedies Under the Lex Fori

The question then becomes what prescriptivejurisdiction or substantive law applies to foreign violations of the law of nations. As Part I
explained, when courts exercise universal jurisdiction under the ATS
they do not apply only national law but also the law of nations. That is,
international law itself prescribes the applicable conduct-regulating
rule. And in civil suits between foreigners for claims arising abroad,
private international law has long provided that the law of the forum,
or the lexfori, supplies the remedy. 7 ' Again, Story could not have been
clearer:
It is universally admitted and established, that the forms of
remedies, and the modes of proceeding, and the execution of
judgments, are to be regulated solely and exclusively by the laws
of the place where the action is instituted; or, as the civilians
uniformly express it, according to the Lexfori.7 2

68. STORY, supra note 61, § 557 (emphasis added).
69. Id. § 3; see also id. § 557 ("The business of the administration ofjustice by any nation is, in
a peculiar and emphatic sense, a part of its public right and duty.").
70. Id. §§ 542, 547.
71. See infra note 72.
72. STORY, supra note 61, § 556; see also, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 41
(1961) (Desmond,J.) ("As to conflict of law rules it is of course settled that the law of the forum is
usually in control as to procedures including remedies."). Some more recent treaties also
expressly contemplate civil and administrative proceedings. See e.g., International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism art. 5, G.A.5, Dec. 9, 1999, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 106-49, 39 I.L.M. 270. But such contemplation does not implicitly erase other principles of
international law that allow states to provide civil proceedings and remedies, like the entire field of
private international law. The treaties themselves in fact are careful to explain that, for example,
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To be certain, "the forms of remedies and the order of judicial
proceedings are to be according to the law of the place where the
action is instituted, without any regard to the domicil of the parties, the origin
of the right, or the country of the act."73 As noted, to treat foreigners

differently could have amounted to a denial ofjustice, or, according to
Story, a refusal of what a nation was 'justly required to do."7
Thus where liability existed on a foreign contract, Story explained,
whether such liability could be enforced against the defendant through
personal arrest, or only in rem, depended on the law of the forum, not
foreign law. This "better opinion now established both in England and
America" was actually exemplified by, among other cases, what today
some would call a "foreign-cubed" case: namely, "a recent case in
England, where the plaintiff and the defendant were both foreigners,
and the debt was contracted in a country, by whose laws the defendant
would not have been liable to an arrest."75 In the case, De la Vega v.
Vianna, the plaintiff, a Spaniard, arrested the defendant, a Portuguese,
in England for a debt arising out of a contract entered into in
Portugal.7 The defendant challenged his arrest on the basis that
Portuguese law governing the contract, or the lex causae, did not
establish that form of remedy.7 The House of Lords flatly rejected this
argument.78 Lord Tenterton explained that the foreign party in England "must take the law as he finds it .

...

He is to have the same rights

which all the subjects of this kingdom are entitled to."7 9
The same should have held for ATS suits under these longstanding
international legal principles. The law of nations creates liability for
universal jurisdiction violations, and the ATS supplies the form of
remedy. A foreign defendant in U.S. court "must take the law as he
finds it," and foreign plaintiffs are "to have the same rights which all the
[citizens of the United States] are entitled to."8 0

"[n]othing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States
and individuals under international law." Id. at art. 21.
73. STORY, supranote 61, § 558 (emphasis added).
74. Id. § 557:
75. Id. § 571.
76. De la Vega v. Vianna, (1830) 109 Eng. Rep. 792 (KB.) 792.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 793.
79. Id.; see also STORY, supra note 61, § 571.
80. De la Vega, [1830] 109 Eng. Rep. at 792-93; STORY, supra note 61, § 571.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

In Kiobel, the Supreme Court contradicted Congress's intent by using
the presumption against extraterritoriality to limit the reach of the
ATS. The Court also strayed away from the more relevant canon of
construction, the Charming Betsy canon, which authorizes the ATS to
reach all claims alleging universal jurisdiction violations of the law of
nations. The crucial point for both canons is that U.S. courts apply
international law as the conduct-regulating rule of decision under the
ATS and forum law, or the lexfori, for procedures and remedies.
Although it came out wrong, Kiobel appeared to accept this crucial
point, and the Court's opinion leaves room for this choice-of-law
framework to operate in at least some future cases alleging multijurisdictional claims. The Court explained that the ATS "does not directly
regulate conduct or afford relief. It instead allows federal courts to
recognize certain causes of action based on sufficiently definite norms
of international law.""' Indeed the Court framed the issue in Kiobel as
"whether the court has authority to recognize a cause of action under
U.S. law to enforce a norm of internationallaw."" Hence international law
supplies the conduct-regulating rule under the ATS and forum law, or
lexfori, supplies the cause of action and the remedy.
The last section of Kiobel then leaves the door open for at least some
future claims involving foreign elements. The Court concluded its
opinion by observing:
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the
United States. And even where the claims touch and concern
the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.
What degree of U.S. connection claims must exhibit to. overcome the
presumption will undoubtedly be the subject of much argument and
litigation. I will conclude by suggesting that international legal principles ofjurisdiction should guide that analysis. Pure universal jurisdiction may be difficult to argue after Kiobel, but there are other bases of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law, including jurisdiction
over activity abroad that has effects within a state (objective territorial-

81. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,-133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
82. Id. at 1661 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 1669.

2013]

1345

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

ity), 84 activity by a state's nationals abroad (active personality) ,85 activity
against a state's nationals abroad (passive personality),"8 and activity
that threatens the state and its official functions (protective principle).8 Construing the statute in line with these principles would be to
construe the ATS under the law of nations it invokes.

84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNYTED STATES

§ 402(1) (c)

(1987).
85. Id. § 402(3) cmt. g.
86. Id.
87. Id. § 402(3) cmt. f.
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